The independence of SPAK is not merely a formal concept, but a functional precondition for ensuring the credibility of its decision-making and for protecting the institution and its prosecutors from any form of undue interference. It must be understood and guaranteed in two interrelated dimensions: its external and internal dimension.

In its external dimension, independence concerns the protection of SPAK from the influence of other state institutions or other actors and factors that could alter the institution’s behaviour or performance. This includes protection from political, administrative, or financial interference, through the establishment of a legal and institutional framework that seeks to prevent external influence over the selection of cases, procedural decision-making, or the substance of prosecutorial actions. In this regard, SPAK’s external independence is based on the separation of its functions from other prosecution offices and the General Prosecution Office, on the special status of its prosecutors, and on mechanisms that limit direct access or interference by the legislature, executive, or other administrative bodies. The institution’s independence would have no real value if it were not accompanied by specific guarantees regarding the appointment, exercise of duties, and protection from unjustified dismissal of its prosecutors, including the Chief Prosecutor. Accordingly, the legal framework provides a multi-dimensional protection that enables SPAK to exercise its powers without functional subordination or external influence.

Internal autonomy, which is equally important, relates to the internal functioning of the institution and the manner in which the professional freedom of individual prosecutors is safeguarded in relation to the SPAK structure and leadership. Internal autonomy means that each special prosecutor is free to act in accordance with the law and professional conscience, without being obligated to follow internal instructions or orders that affect the substance of their decisions. This autonomy is especially significant in a specialized structure like SPAK, where procedural workload and public sensitivity are high, and where pressure for results may interfere with, influence, or even undermine professionalism. Furthermore, the internal functioning of SPAK is designed to avoid rigid decision-making hierarchies within the institution. The role of the Chief Prosecutor of SPAK is limited to organizational and coordinative leadership, without authority to interfere in the procedural matters of other prosecutors. Procedural cases are assigned through formalized procedures, and decision-making retains its individual and accountable nature. These mechanisms are designed to protect professional freedom, uphold the integrity of procedural decisions, and ensure a clear separation between leadership responsibilities and the prosecutorial decision-making function.

On the other hand, ensuring SPAK’s accountability requires both ex ante and ex post mechanisms, which serve as forms of democratic oversight, performance evaluation, and verification of the institution’s integrity in practice. However, in reality, these mechanisms often fail to function effectively and sustainably in terms of systematically monitoring the fulfillment of institutional objectives, upholding standards, and exercising real control over the quality, performance, and efficiency of the Special Prosecution Office’s activity.

Ex ante accountability mechanisms provide for a range of procedures, such as the approval of the budget, determination of the organizational structure, and the legal framework in relation to institutions like the Albanian Parliament and the High Prosecutorial Council (HPC). Through these mechanisms, it is ensured that SPAK operates in accordance with the rule of law, principles of efficiency, proportionality, and budgetary transparency, as well as in line with the strategic objectives of justice reform.

The High Prosecutorial Council (HPC), as the body responsible for administering the prosecution system, plays a central role in guaranteeing the balance between institutional independence and the accountability of special structures within this system. This responsibility takes on a particular dimension when applied to SPAK, due to the institution’s distinct legal regulation. In this regard, the HPC exercises ex ante oversight, including the selection and appointment of special prosecutors, approval of SPAK’s organizational structure, and the ethical and professional evaluation of prosecutors. Meanwhile, ex post oversight involves SPAK’s obligation to report periodically on its activities—both in terms of operational results and institutional and administrative performance.

SPAK’s accountability also extends to ethics and discipline, through the professional oversight system guaranteed by the HPC and the High Justice Inspector (HJI). These institutions have the competence to evaluate the conduct of SPAK prosecutors, address complaints against them, and investigate any potential violations of ethics or the law, following a regular and independent procedure. This disciplinary control system does not conflict with the individual independence of prosecutors but exists as a tool to preserve professional integrity and ensure that independently conferred powers are exercised responsibly.

The Parliament of Albania plays a defined role in monitoring the general functioning of SPAK through the annual reporting mechanism carried out by the head of the institution. This reporting occurs at least once per year, before the Parliament and/or the Committee on Legal Affairs, Public Administration and Human Rights, and includes data on crime trends, the volume and effectiveness of the institution’s work, and its administrative aspects.

The law stipulates that this report must be general and not contain information on specific criminal cases, except in instances where the Parliament decides otherwise through a special resolution. In addition to the annual report, the head of SPAK is also required to cooperate with the Parliament in the context of parliamentary inquiry committees, while respecting legal boundaries regarding the separation of functions between criminal and parliamentary investigations.

Institutional reporting serves as a form of ex post accountability before the legislative power and is conducted through a hearing process in which the head of SPAK presents structured information and responds to questions or requests for clarification from committee members or the plenary session. The report is accompanied by parliamentary discussions and recommendations, which are reflected in the final documentation of the Parliament but are not binding on the prosecution authority.

The role of the executive in relation to SPAK involves administrative, strategic, and supportive aspects, which aim to ensure the effective functioning of the institution without influencing or compromising its functional and decision-making independence. This role spans areas such as ensuring the physical and personal security of prosecutors and institutional premises, financial planning and support, issuing strategic recommendations for guiding criminal policy, and institutional cooperation through the Ministry of Justice as a liaison with the Council of Ministers. In the budgetary field, the Head of SPAK prepares a dedicated budget proposal for the institution, which is reviewed by the Ministry of Justice and submitted to the Council of Ministers. If the proposal is not approved as requested, the Head of SPAK has the right to defend the request before Parliament. This process maintains a balance between the independence of justice institutions and the executive’s role as guarantor of their financial functioning.

Meanwhile, at the strategic level, the Council of Ministers, through the Minister of Justice, annually approves and addresses to the prosecution system a package of priority recommendations aimed at strengthening the fight against corruption and organized crime. These recommendations, which may not include any intervention in specific criminal cases, are advisory in nature and serve to set shared objectives at the level of public policy, in accordance with national and international strategies. Overall, the executive’s role toward SPAK is conceived as a controlled institutional interaction, establishing a support mechanism without infringing upon the constitutional and legal competencies of the institution, while respecting the separation of powers and ensuring the implementation of state policies in the field of criminal justice.